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ABSTRACT 
EFFECTS OF NEWS MEDIA CONSUMPTION ON POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP, 
IDENTITY AND ISSUE STANCES 
 
 
 
Dalton T. Bouzek 
 
 
Marquette University, 2019 
 
 
 
 This research sought to identify to what extent news media consumption plays a 
role in forming an individual’s political identity and their views on individual stances. 
The subsequent novel quantitative study asked students of various disciplines at 
Marquette University questions in regards to how much they pay attention to various 
news sources, to what extent they trust those news sources, and their views on individual 
issues as they relate to their chosen political identity. Results from the study found basic 
trends in regards to selected news sources and one’s political disposition. Furthermore, 
stances on certain issues, like border security, were found to be more heavily shaped by 
media consumption patterns, showing the power of how news media frames issues. This 
study can be thought of as a precursor for more expansive research that could include a 
more representative sample of the American population. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The 2018 Midterm Elections presented a curious instance that is potentially not all 
that uncommon. While a so-called “blue wave” swept through many states, some states 
also re-elected conservative legislators. This practice is not so remarkable as the 
juxtaposition of these conservative legislators winning elections via the same voters that 
also passed ballot initiatives that, in many instances, were directly opposed by the 
winning politicians. In essence, voters were concurrently voting for and against policies 
they supported.  
A specific example of this phenomenon in practice was in Missouri during the 
2018 elections. Conservatives won six of the eight US House seats, and flipped the lone 
Senate contest from a Democrat to a Republican. At first glance, these results would 
suggest that conservatism had taken a firm hold in the state, and is even on the rise. 
However, the rest of the election results suggest otherwise. The same voters that helped 
give rise to conservative representatives concurrently also voted for and helped pass 
several measures that would be antithetical to conservative principles. For example, 
according to the political tracking site Ballotpedia.org, Amendment 1, a bill that would 
require more regulation of campaign finance, political lobbying, and redistricting, passed 
with 62% of the vote. Amendment 2, a bill to legalize medicinal marijuana, passed with 
65% of the vote. Lastly, Proposition B, a bill to incrementally increase the state’s 
minimum wage to $12 per hour by 2023, passed with 63% of the vote.  
Of the politicians and lobbies that expressed a firm position on these three 
measures, conservatives generally opposed all three, with special emphasis on opposing 
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Amendment 1. Since these so-called “progressive” measures passed in a fairly 
overwhelming manner, one might expect the contests in which conservatives won to have 
been fairly close races. However, with the exception of District 2, Conservatives won 
each district by no fewer than 30 points, signaling generally widespread support. 
Similarly, in the Senate race, which all voters in the state were eligible for, Conservatives 
successfully flipped the seat by six points. Due to this vast disparity, we can notice a clear 
incongruence in the minds of the voters. 
 Of course, in the case above, the grander question is “why?” Why do voters, or 
even non-voters, seem inclined to support policy incongruent with their self-identified 
ideology? The first inclination a researcher might have in this instance is to question 
whether individuals even know what their true political identity is. For example, a widely 
shared article by VICE this past October asked the question, “Does anyone actually know 
what Socialism is?” This article, along with many others, show that Americans seem to 
conflate political ideologies, such as “socialism” and “democratic socialism,” with one 
another. At first glance, these nuances may not seem to carry any sort of real-world 
significance. However, as authors Christopher Achen and Larry Bartles explain, “even 
the most well-informed voters tend to vote based on partisan loyalties, rather than issues 
at hand.” Essentially, if voters align themselves with a party or group that they share little 
in common with, we are left with election results such as those during the 2018 Midterm 
Elections. Perhaps, the best way to correct this problem is not to push for more education 
on individual issues, but rather, to help educate the public as to what the labels they apply 
to themselves actually mean. 
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 As will be discussed on in this study, the media is one of the most influential 
factors in helping individuals forge group identities, especially in the 21st century. 
Currently, many news outlets, whether in print, digital, or broadcast, tend to specifically 
state their political spin. For example, far-right news outlet Breitbart, the 61st most visited 
website in the United States, has explicitly stated that they are the “platform for White 
Supremacy,” by its former head Steve Bannon (Nguyen, 2017). Moving leftward, the 
third most watched news network in the country, has also explicitly stated their political 
stance as “left-leaning” by their Senior Vice President Phil Griffin (Steinberg, 2007).  
 While news organizations have had general political affiliations for some time, it 
seems it is growing harder to find more politically neutral news. Even though this 
phenomenon is not inherently bad, as we will see, it has vast consequences for our 
political landscape. When citizens do not have access to factually accurate information, 
whether by their own choice, or as a result of an “anti-neutrality,” the identities they form 
as a result of their consumption of that media will undoubtedly produce identities with 
contradictory foundations.  
These politically biased news organizations also seem to be redefining labels 
themselves. For example, MSNBC, which we have identified as generally left leaning, 
does not always espouse views congruent with typical “left” thought. In recent times, 
MSNBC anchors have criticized decisions to lift economic sanctions on North Korea, as 
well as removal of military troops from Syria. Traditionally, both of these actions are 
inherently leftist in nature (in terms of being anti-interventionist in economics and anti-
imperialist). However, a regular MSNBC viewer may conflate military interventionism 
and economic austerity with leftist philosophy. In this case, leftist thought has been 
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usurped by corporate media in order to push a particular narrative, and in turn, has 
redefined popular “leftist” discourse in America.  
Similarly, Fox News, which is generally conservative in its commentary, has also 
taken it into its own hands to redefine what is “acceptable right-wing thought and 
discourse.” Traditionally, conservative thought is embedded in individualism and 
isolationism (in terms of policy), and in America, constitutional absolutism. However, 
conservative networks like Fox News embrace ideas such as increased government 
surveillance and lowering barriers between religion and the state, both of which are 
inherently antithetical to philosophical conservatism. In the cases of Fox News and 
MSNBC (amongst others), one can see how not only are party and in-group identities 
reinforced, but once inside those groups, the foundational understanding of what it means 
to be on the “left” or “right” is being deliberately shifted.  
Therefore, by understanding how media consumption, specifically, news media 
consumption, influences voters’ views on both issues and their own political label, we 
can begin to understand the problem, if it is pronounced as it may seem. 
Exploration of how one identifies one’s self politically, which may in be in accord 
or contrast to their active beliefs or practices, can be analyzed through a myriad of 
concepts - namely cognitive dissonance, selective exposure, and social identity theory. 
Through the course examining precedents in this area of study, we can then construct a 
proper framework for proceeding and understanding what the results of this study might 
suggest. For the purposes of this study, this research sought to uncover whether 
individuals are prone to “misidentifying” themselves in terms of political affiliation by 
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examining if their held beliefs and subsequent actions align with the principles of each of 
the “identities” listed in the subsequent survey.  
In order to flush out the extent to which the media contributes to our 
understanding, or lack thereof, of what it means to belong to a certain political group and 
what the subsequent ideals of that group entail, first a thorough understanding of basics 
of group and identity dynamics should be explored. In accord with group dynamics, one 
must also investigate the role of cognitive dissonance as it applies to seeking and 
attaining new political information, and how this process may also lead to selective 
exposure. With those ideas solidified, exploring them in practice, via a survey distributed 
to college students, which asks about their media habits and their political attitudes and 
ideologies, will help us to better understand if there is a link between certain political 
news exposure and incongruences in political identity and thought.  
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Background studies 
 
As a precursor and one of the inspirations for this study, Dreier (2017) noticed a 
dissonance between general attitude polls towards American social and economic issues, 
and the number of individuals who carry the labels of “liberal” and “conservative.” While 
this study looks to dig much further than the “liberal-conservative” binary, Dreier’s 
observations pointed to a general trend towards this dissonance that may be prevalent. 
The Gallup and Pew polls Dreier cited indicate that while roughly one-third of Americans 
“share both liberal and conservative views,” there seems to be an imbalance towards the 
left. For example, more than 70% of individuals surveyed indicated that they favor or 
support a variety of what are thought of as liberal causes, such as: abortion, 
environmental conservation, restrictions on firearms, corporate taxation, and solving 
economic inequality. While some of these figures undoubtedly are rooted in “single 
issue” crossover, the larger picture, and this subsequent study, may indicate that many 
individuals are at a crisis of identity. 
In a similar vein, a recent Gallup poll showed that only about 59% of Americans 
actually identified as affiliated with a political party – with 25% being “Republican” and 
34% identifying as “Democrat.” So, where does that leave the remaining 40 or so percent 
of Americans? According to the poll, the remainder of the populace generally identifies 
as “independent.” As will be discussed later, there exists a danger of conflating all 
political independents into one group. According to the survey, even though some 40% of 
the population calls themselves “independents,” they do still tend to vote for one of the 
two major parties, with Republicans being the biggest beneficiary. This prompts the 
question, “Why identify as an Independent if one consistently votes for one party time 
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and time again?” According to a 2018 Pew survey, one reason might be that there is a 
stigma in siding with a particular party, especially in times of perceived polarization. The 
survey also notes that many times, Independents claim to vote not necessarily for a 
particular party, but against another. One could draw two conclusions from this. On one 
hand, we could view potential party misidentification merely as a pragmatic practice, 
whereby individuals merely claim to be “Independent” in order to avoid stigma or 
ridicule, all the while actually supporting a given party or position. On the other hand, 
and my personal belief, is that individuals only adopt labels like “Independent” because 
they do not have a firm grasp on what it means to identify with a label such as “socialist” 
or “right-libertarian,” because they merely have not been educated on the various labels 
and ideological positions by both the education system, and more importantly, the media. 
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Identification as a precursor for action 
 
In-group identity and attitudes affiliated with those identities are important 
variables in terms of predicting political action. Underlining the importance of the 
purpose of this study as a whole, Becker, Taush, Spears, and Christ (2011) emphasize 
that one strong precondition for, in this case, political activism, is in fact an 
acknowledged affiliation with a social “in-group.” Furthermore, when an individual or 
group has their beliefs or values “violated” by their chosen social group, dissociation will 
likely follow, as noted by Glasford, Pratto and Dovidio (2008). Of course, as Monroe, 
Hankin and Van Vechten (2000) point out, identities that are learned through a more 
formal process, such as careful study of identities and stances on issues, are far more 
flexible than identities that are shaped primarily by social interaction. We may see 
individuals shed labels or attain them, based on their desired group’s perception of them. 
An example that could be applied from Isseroff (2003) would be a religious group 
denouncing extremist practices, including violence. This may lead to those who 
previously thought themselves to be a “purist” part of that group to shed the label, even if 
the majority of their beliefs coincide with the majority. This phenomenon may certainly 
be observed within political groups, wherein, a politician may rid themselves of a label or 
party, based on the actions of that party, either in general, or towards them. Take former 
California Congressional candidate Gil Cisneros, for example, who held many of the core 
principles that align with conservatism, except for his stance towards the Affordable Care 
Act. In that instance, Cisneros switched his political label to Democrat, which coincides 
with a “liberal” political stance (at least as we think of it in the American sense). The 
dissonance sought in this research and its prevalence in the American public is further 
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punctuated by cases like this. Cisneros, who now calls himself a “liberal,” in fact shares 
very little in common with the greater ideology. Of course, we may think that cases such 
as Cisneros’ are done so consciously out of political necessity. That is to say, candidates 
may recognize that often times understand that the label they apply to themselves are 
more important than the policies they actually support. However, as other researchers, 
have illuminated, this process may be done unconsciously or by virtue of media and 
social faculties.  
Kerpelman (1969) explored differences in political activism when groups were 
divided by ideology. One of the general hypotheses of this study as a whole is that those 
who have higher levels of political knowledge will be less likely to misidentify 
themselves, and therefore, will be more likely to be active members of the political 
process. Kerpelman noted, “those who were considered ‘activists’ showed significantly 
higher levels of intelligence than those who were ‘non activists.’” This would allow one 
to perhaps suppose that those who are correctly able to identify themselves on the 
political spectrum would also be more likely to partake in political action. This would 
support the idea that in order for significant political change to occur, constituents would 
need to have higher levels of political education so that they could correctly identify their 
ideologies and act on behalf of the ideals of those groups.  
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Cognitive Dissonance’s role in political identity crisis 
 
In his most famous work A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Festinger’s (1957) 
main thesis is that “individuals strive for internal psychological consistency.” 
Consequently, Festinger argues that, “when there is psychological inconsistency, the 
individual becomes uncomfortable and ultimately tries to alleviate this discomfort.” 
Generally, this means individuals might simply ignore or avoid new information in order 
to achieve a mental balance. More specifically, Festinger believes there are four steps in 
which individuals will undergo in order to avoid cognitive dissonance. First, Festinger 
explains that a person may actually change their behavior to match their mental faculties, 
beliefs and cognitions. If the person is not willing to, or unable to change their behavior, 
Festinger states that the person may “change the cognition,” which could be exemplified 
in the political context if one were to support a law that some consider racist, with the 
justification laying in some other arena, such as economic impacts of the given law. If the 
person does not change their cognition, Festinger states that they may, “add cognition,” 
which might be exemplified by believing a more serious situation can be rectified by 
undertaking a much less serious action. For example, if a municipality were to take 
measures to ban single-use plastics and assumed they were doing all they could to combat 
climate change, when in reality, the problem at hand would hardly be affected. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly for the purposes of exploration of cognitive dissonance in 
political campaigns, Festinger stipulates that the individual  “simply ignores or discredits 
the new conflicting information.”  
Building off of this, Festinger and his colleagues sought to uncover the conditions 
in which individuals and groups “harden” their beliefs when presented with contrary 
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information. In their book When Prophecy Fails (1956), Festinger and other researchers 
examined the factors that lead to increased “conviction” in beliefs amongst doomsday 
cult members. According to the authors, the first major factor is that “beliefs must be 
relevant to a believers actions.” In the political realm, this might manifest in a citizen 
voting for a border wall, despite evidence that a wall would not reduce harm, merely 
because they live near a national border. The second major factor is that “beliefs must 
have already produced actions that are difficult to undo.” This could play out politically 
by a citizen who voted for a border wall that was eventually made, despite evidence that 
it produces significant ecological damage, continuing to support its existence. Third, 
Festinger and his colleagues acknowledged that, “the belief must be sufficiently specific 
and concerned with the real world that it can be clearly disconfirmed.” A political 
example of this may include voicing support for the concentration camps sprouting up 
along the southern US border by making the issue an argument over semantics, rather 
than what is physically happening. The fourth factor identified by the researchers is, “the 
disconfirming evidence must be acknowledged by the believer.” For example, in order 
for a voter or constituent to “double down” on a claim, they must first acknowledge that a 
given point, such as “a border wall does not reduce the number of illegal immigrants,” is 
factually correct, before they will find other reasons to delve deeper into their beliefs. The 
final factor illuminated by the researchers is that, “The believer must have social support 
from fellow believers.” For example, a collective acknowledgement of a falsely held fact, 
will likely lead to further solidification of other beliefs that are also wrong, according to 
Festinger. In the political realm, we see this behavior reinforced often times by partisan 
media, which this study hopes to illuminate.   
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Festinger’s theory has also helped cultivate the idea of “selective exposure,” to 
explain media consumption habits in accord with cognitive dissonance. Klapper (1960) 
famously argued in his magnum opus that the media primarily exists as a tool to reinforce 
our beliefs and values. This idea of selective exposure also leads to what Klapper calls 
“selective retention,” whereby an individual will either interpret a message in such a way 
that fits their predispositions, or simply discredits or discards information that does not fit 
their worldview. Important to this study, Stroud (2010) indicates that this selective 
exposure has led to the increased polarization that permeates American politics, since 
there are an abundance of readily available media options that can suit nearly any 
political dispositions. 
The sheer number of available news sources may also play a key factor in the 
significance of selective exposure. According to Fischer (2008), when an individual has a 
plethora of information sources to choose from, they are more likely to select the source 
that holds information closest to their precognitions. Given the vastness and general 
availability of news outlets to the public, individuals have more options at their disposal 
than ever before – and therefore, they have a higher likelihood to pre-select news to 
confirm their biases. This theory is further solidified by measures related to self-
identified partisanship amongst viewers of explicitly partisan news, such as Fox News. 
For example according to a Pew (2014) study entitled Political Polarization and Media 
Bias, 47% of Fox News viewers identify as “consistent conservatives.” Similarly, those 
who identify as “consistent conservatives” also rate explicitly right-wing news outlets 
such as Breitbart, the Rush Limbaugh Show, and The Blaze, as “generally trustworthy.” 
The study also shows that those who self-identify as being on the left also tend to 
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gravitate towards more left-leaning news sources, thus showing a clear example of 
selective exposure as a significant force in political news and discourse.  
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Identity as ideology 
 
 As a plethora of researchers have pointed out, membership within a group may 
actually be a leading cause of attitudes, ideologies, and behaviors. The first phenomenon 
mentioned, with pertinence towards the research questions, is the observable disconnect 
between political identification and ideology. This second phenomenon is also quite 
noteworthy of exploration, as misinformation about a political affiliation or ideology 
would certainly lead to a dissonance in terms of label and personal stance on issues and 
attitudes. Through the scope of Social Identity Theory, we can begin to see patterns 
emerge in terms of how ideology may be constructed based off of a label, and vice versa. 
 Tajfel et al. (1974) explored the idea of “minimal group” paradigm, in which 
individuals who were arbitrarily placed in a group tended to favor other group members 
and their practices more favorably than those who were matched up with others, even if 
the “other” members had more in common with them in reality. In effect, that “group,” in 
Tajfel’s case, became the ideology of its members. Similarly, those in the political realm 
tend to experience the same phenomenon. Gerber, Huber and Washington (2010) sought 
to show that the relationship between political label and ideology is not necessarily 
mutual in terms of influence. While their study pertained to a rigid set of affiliations, in 
this case, Democrats and Republicans, they still were able to show general strengthening 
of ideology, simply by being reminded of their chosen political identity. On a larger 
scale, Huddy and Khatib (2007) observed that a more grandiose identity, such as a 
national identity, has direct influence over secondary identities, which ultimately 
influences ideology. For example, if an individual identifies as a “steel worker” 
primarily, and a “union member” secondarily, they may limit their union behavior based 
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on what they believe it means to be a “steel worker,” such as abiding by different codes 
of ethics or interactions with others. Of course, Huddy also notes that an incomplete or 
subjective understanding of a political affiliation or ideology leads to what amounts to a 
dissonance between the two. One such instance explored in this research is a problem 
observed by Citrin, Wong and Duff (2000), where individual’s understanding of what 
comprises a “true American,” affects what they deem as American values, leading to a 
disconnect in understanding over what is seemingly the same label. Similar to the last 
example, if one believes that a “true American” ought to be based on inclusivity and 
absolute freedoms, while another who identifies with the same label believes that label is 
grounded in patriotism and religion, the label itself loses value as it is being construed in 
various ways, leading to breakdowns in communication.  
According to Greene (2004), Americans, specifically, may tend to maintain a 
more muddled political identity. For Greene, due to the strong emphasis placed on the 
idea of “independence” in the country, constituents may more often identify as 
“independents,” even when their ideologies are more or less attributable to another label. 
Greene also states that this phenomenon is exacerbated by news outlets “treating 
independents as a singular group.” Often, voters or constituents may understand 
“independent” to be politically center, however, this ignores the nuances that, say, a left-
libertarian may have with a Marxist-Leninist in terms of ideology, which would make 
someone between those positions an “independent” as well by these same standards. 
Similarly, the media also tends to attribute politicians who are not in total accord with the 
rest of their political parties as “independent,” such as Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, 
for example, though, ideologically, he is clearly left of center (by American standards). 
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At the same time, Maine Senator Susan Collins is also labeled an “independent” by news 
outlets, even though she is ideologically right of center, according to the vote tracker on 
fivethirtyeight.com (2017). This conflation of what it means to be “independent” 
conveyed by the news media undoubtedly has an impact on how voters label themselves, 
as well. For example, if a politician or canvasser is speaking with an individual who 
labels themselves as “independent,” they may not know how to steer the conversation or 
how to relate to the voter, given the polarized definition of what it means to be 
“independent.” 
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Media as ideology 
 
 We have discussed the relationship between group identity and ideology, but 
crucial to this study is the role the media plays in both forging and maintaining this 
relationship.  
Litt (1963) commented on the role of media and education acting as an 
“indoctrinator” for the state, in terms of political values and ideals. Of course, as 
numerous commentators, such as Chomsky have noted, when an ideology can run 
contrary to the state’s position, this may relay to misconceptions about those ideologies, 
and a strengthening of the “desired” valuative outcomes. For example, if an ideology like 
socialism or collectivism were to spread in popularity in the United States, likely what 
would follow would be a campaign of misinformation about that ideology in order to gain 
more support for rebuking it. In essence, there is a great incentive for the government, 
media and education institutions to misinform the public about general political issues 
and happenings, as more education would likely have an adverse effect on the status quo.  
Sociologist William Gamson (1988) examined how muddled political discourse, 
shaped by the media, seems to lead to confused ideological stances amongst the 
populace. Gamson states, “Public discourse draws on a catalogue of metaphors, catch-
phrases, and appeals to principle…elements within these catalogues are clustered, and 
therefore, we encounter discourse in terms of not individual items, but packages.” 
Essentially, Gamson is eluding to the idea that by referring to events and ideas through 
frames that would generally be incompatible for one another (he uses the phrase “Peace 
through Strength” as an example), the media does not lay a proper foundation for the 
public to discuss and become educated about relevant issues. For example, Fox News has 
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reported on a so-called “War on Christmas,” where their commentators believe that 
Christian values are under attack. In this case, there is no “war,” and “Christmas” is the 
stand-in for all of the values they hold dear. However, this metaphor may confuse the 
viewer into believing there is an actual assault on Christians and Christian values are at 
real danger of being phased out. Of course, this is not wholly true, yet politicians still use 
this fear mongering rhetoric in order to appeal to voters and constituents, since the media 
has conditioned them to speak in these false terms. We see this exemplified during 
campaign rallies for now President Donald Trump, where he exclaims, “You can finally 
say ‘Merry Christmas’ again!” when in fact this tradition had never ceased (.  
Similarly, Gamson notes that the media generally borrows metaphors and motifs 
from non-traditional political discourse and injects them into the popular discourse. For 
example, Gamson points to the phenomenon of automation and its political ramifications 
being framed as a “loss of self-reliance” by the media, since American culture is very 
much based on valuing individualism. Examples like these, where Gamson has shown the 
media to appeal to generalized values and conflating them with events that have real-
world consequences, media viewers, and Americans, especially, are at a significant 
disadvantage of forming a fact-based political ideology. As we will see, when individuals 
do not have a proper ideological foundation, they will continue to perpetuate the cycle of 
misinformation or ignorance through devices such as selective-exposure.  
 Taber and Lodge (2009) explored the nature of individuals’ news-seeking habits 
as it pertained to their self-identified political label. Their study determined that 
individuals were not only more likely to select information on a given topic from a source 
that they agreed with, but they also were more likely to rate opposing arguments for the 
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same issue to be “weaker,” so long as it came from an adversarial source, regardless of 
logical merit. This phenomenon mentioned by Taber and Lodge harkens back to Kunda’s 
(1990) idea of “motivated skepticism,” wherein an individual will apply their 
preconceived beliefs and attitudes in the search or confirmation of those beliefs when 
alternative information is presented.  
 With this information in mind, it is important to consider to what extent 
individuals and groups’ identities are influenced by the media and the information they 
gather from it. A Pew News Attitudes Survey (2013) indicates that 63% of self-identified 
Democrats listed CNN as their primary news source. Conversely, the same study 
indicated that 63% of Republicans use Fox News as their primary news source. Given the 
overtly partisan nature of those two networks, we can observe a fostering of ideals that 
cater to the bases of each of those two groups, by the network. The aforementioned 
example of Fox News pandering to the “War on Christmas” also fits this mold. Given 
that Fox News has identified their audience to be both staunchly conservative and 
Christian, the language used by their commentators to stir up fear that its audience’s way 
of life is under attack is utilized in a manner to push the audience further to the periphery 
of the political spectrum. An even more current example of this at play is the coverage of 
the New Zealand mosque shootings. While other news outlets like MSNBC expressly 
labeled the shooter as a terrorist, Fox News shifted the conversation towards mental 
health, since they were reluctant to label a Caucasian who killed Muslims a “terrorist,” 
since that label would be counter to the prevailing narrative of who terrorists are. 
 To state the obvious, knowledge of history, as well as a certain amount of political 
literacy are essential in molding the political outlook of an individual and groups. Oswald 
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(2009) points out that, “Media only cover established values and conventional 
perspectives that uphold the status quo.” Regardless of political affiliation and preferred 
news source, both of the aforementioned networks report news in such a way that 
upholds the “conventional” perspectives held by both liberal and conservative ideologies 
as a whole. Those perspectives, one could argue, are still very much the same, with only 
superficial differences, and still exist in a way that seeks to uphold the status quo. This 
status quo is propped up with help from both liberal and conservative ideologies being 
hostile to others. Hostility in this regard, as it relates to news consumption and shaping of 
ideology leads to misinformation amongst the citizenry. This is not exclusive to certain 
subjective ideals, but for verifiable facts and definitions, as well. For example, a Gallup 
Polling Matters Survey (2018) reported that Americans had a very uneducated view of 
what the word “Socialism” meant. In that survey, 28% of respondents did not even know 
what “socialism” meant, while 46% expressed minimal to no understanding of the term 
nor concept. It goes without saying that the misinformation that is attached to certain 
terms with fixed, verifiable meanings, like “socialism,” have a significant impact on the 
shaping and reforming of an individual’s political alignment. This gap in knowledge then 
opens the door for mainstream media outlets to cultivate an idea of what a term like 
“socialism” means, which may make its viewers even more hostile to that ideology. For 
example, Fox News has labeled newly elected New York representative Alexandria 
Ocasio-Cortez as a “socialist,” and attributes various out-of-context soundbytes and 
misinterpretations of her ideals to be tenants of socialism. When this happens, viewers of 
networks like Fox News (though others like MSNBC are also guilty of the same practice) 
end up believing that “socialism is when we do not get to eat meat,” and “socialism is 
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where everyone gets half of your income.” Of course, to a politically literate individual, 
these assertions are obviously untrue. However, to a person that solely relies on a cable 
news network for political information, these assertions are taken literally, and that 
person may be irrationally hostile to that given political ideology. 
If we use Chomsky (1988) for guidance as to why this phenomenon exists, we 
would find that misinformation of this nature exists for the explicit reason to uphold the 
status quo, and mold citizens to be of similar mindsets that are not hostile to the state. As 
argued with this research, even the extent that this misinformation is disseminated by 
each of the individual news networks is of the utmost importance in determining one’s 
assumed political affiliation and the implications of society at-large. 
 Media illiteracy, coupled with misinformation passed off as fact by the media, can 
also affect people’s ideology and their propensity to engage with politics. Ugland (2019) 
alludes to the notion that even though media and information is accessible to more people 
now than ever before, media illiteracy has a substantial impact on people’s ability to 
critically reason, and subsequently, form a coherent ideology. While one might assume 
that current 18-24 year-olds are more media literate than the same cohort was in previous 
periods, and are therefore more likely to responsibly consume news and to engage 
politically, that is not the case. Ugland mentions that only 40% of 18-29 year olds were 
politically active (in terms of voting in national elections), although deciding on what 
candidate to vote for should theoretically be easier than ever before. This gap in 
information as it relates to real-world action is likely indicative of a lack of political 
efficacy, but where does this sentiment come from? One might conclude from this 
research that because many are not well-versed in media and civic terms (and their 
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consequences), perhaps news media fills a void in terms of setting attitudes to have 
toward government. While this thesis focuses on college students, who are likely more 
media literate than the average of this age demographic, perhaps certain parallels will 
remain in terms of sentiment towards government and ideological dissonance due to their 
media consumption habits. 
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News Media Consumption Trends 
 
 To serve as a proper basis for understanding exactly what news media is having 
the most profound impact on the American public, in terms of swaying one’s political 
ideology, we must first consider the greater general trends in news media consumption.  
 According to the Pew Research State of the Media report (2018), cable news 
networks experienced a relatively sharp 12% decrease in primetime viewership to about 
1.2 million combined viewers across three major networks of CNN, MSNBC and FOX 
over the past year. Similarly, network news (as defined by over-the-air broadcasts, rather 
than cable) experienced a 7% decrease in viewership over the past year, with 
approximately 5.8 million viewers per night combined. Local news networks experienced 
essentially the same trends as national network news as well. Despite the sharp declines 
in viewership, the report still maintains that television is the primary news source for 
most Americans.  
 If television news consumption is declining, we must turn our attention to the 
fastest growing medium for news consumption, digital media. According to the report, 
approximately 93% of Americans consume news from an online platform. For the 
purposes of Pew’s report, digital media was defined as “a digitally native news service,” 
which means that the organization was founded online, rather than being a spin-off of an 
existing media company. The report stated that there were 35 websites that generated at 
least 10 million visitors each month, contributing to a massive diversity in terms of 
sources and ideologies woven into news coverage. Of these 35 sites, majority of them 
also had a presence on aggregator services, such as Apple News, and nearly all of them 
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had social media accounts across platforms like Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, which 
allows more access points for the public to consume news. 
 As we can see from this report, Americans are getting their political news from a 
more vast field than ever before. While television continues to be the primary platform 
for news consumption, the emergence of digital-native news companies, which often 
times fill a niche market in terms of political ideology, is generating a landscape where 
Americans can get news tailored to their political preferences. Conversely, Americans 
may also have their political identities altered by hyper-partisan media, which makes for 
a more complicated political arena as a whole. 
 Overall, the effects of cognitive dissonance, selective exposure and social identity 
theory, all seem to be driving forces of not only our political identities, but our political 
misinformation as well. As evidenced by the 2018 elections, inconsistencies in ideology 
and voting patterns have not gone away, despite a plethora of information being available 
to prospective voters. This thesis attempted, first, to uncover the extent to which the 
media is responsible for misinforming voters to the point where they fail to possess 
consistency within their ideology, and, second, to understand the extent to which this 
phenomenon leads to inaction or political cynicism. 
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Research Questions 
  
In this research, the following questions were explored: 
 
Q1: Is there a relationship between what media sources individuals pay the most 
attention to and their attitudes toward individual ideological positions? 
 
Q2: Is there a relationship between an individual’s feelings of political 
efficacy/action and their ideology score? Furthermore, is there a relationship 
between trust placed in media and one’s feelings of political efficacy? 
 
Q3: To what extent do individuals accurately label themselves politically? 
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Methodology 
 
Participants 
 
 The participants in this study consisted of college students of various disciplines. 
By targeting college students rather than the general population, this study has a novel 
focus. These student participants are of different disciplines in order to get a better gauge 
on overall media consumption habits and their ideological effects. One would assume 
today’s youth are more media savvy than previous generations, and therefore, a more 
unique circumstance exists where college students may be less likely to accept news 
media information at face value. Therefore, this potential skepticism will certainly affect 
how these individuals identify politically and their level of ideological consistency, as 
this survey tried to explore.  
 In total, there were roughly 300 respondents for this survey. Of this population, 
approximately 200 were Communication students, while roughly 100 were Psychology 
students. Students who participated in this anonymous survey received extra credit for the 
course in which the survey was offered. In order to ensure anonymity of the participants, 
the survey did not require participants to list their name or student identification number 
on the survey itself. Instead, they submitted a screenshot of the completion screen of the 
survey and submitted that to an online Dropbox. This ensured that participants were 
compensated while maintaining their anonymity.  
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Survey 
 
 The survey for this research consists of three parts. The first asks general media 
usage questions, such as ranking various media outlets in order of trustworthiness, and 
asking how much time the participants spend consuming news. This section also asks 
important political identity and efficacy questions, which may serve as predictors of 
ideological consistency when coupled with other variables, such as preferred news 
outlets.  
 The second section of the survey is based off a pre-existing survey from Chaffee 
and Schleuder (1985). This segment asks participants how much attention they pay to 
different political news media when seeking political information. For example, 
participants are asked on a scale of “1 to 5” (with 1 being the highest and 5 being none) 
how much attention they pay to national newspapers, national political talk shows, and 
social media accounts of political commentators when seeking reliable information.  
 The final section of the survey is composed of various “level of agreement” 
statements to gauge the respondents’ ideological leanings on specific issues. Some of 
these questions are borrowed from the Pew Ideological Consistency Scale; however, 
many of them are new additions or are modified for clarity. For the sake of consistency 
and ease of coding, the statements are all from a far-right ideological perspective, so that 
responses can help determine an aggregate score to determine where the participant falls 
along the political spectrum.  
In order to help determine the effects of media consumption on perceived political 
ideology, a quantitative survey asking about participants’ views on certain ideological 
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positions, juxtaposed against their media consumption habits, gave some insight about 
the extent to which media consumption can shape political identity. 
 Due to the purpose of this study, which seeks to cover a more complete political 
picture, existing political scales were inadequate. Given that the main two ideologies that 
individuals in the United States identify with are “liberal” and “conservative,” most of the 
scales merely reflected this binary. However, there are many problems with this 
dichotomy. First, the definitions of “liberal” and “conservative” used in common political 
discourse are imprecise. Historically, “liberal” was used to merely describe someone who 
placed individualism and personal liberty above all else, as political philosophers, such as 
Locke, described. Today, many think of the term “liberal” as exclusively on the left, 
though many supposed “liberal” politicians have views that more closely align with right-
wing policy. For example, Democratic primary candidate Beto O’Rourke is generally 
described as “liberal,” though, he has various right-wing views.  According to political 
fact-checking website On The Issues (2019), O’Rourke supports military expansion, 
opposes single-payer healthcare, and has a record of opposing housing for low-income 
individuals – all of which rebuke a left-wing ideology. 
 We also see examples of this inaccurate binary presented in contemporary 
research. The Pew Ideological Consistency Scale asks questions designed to characterize 
people as “liberal” or “conservative.” One question, for example, asks participants to 
select which these two statements most closely aligns with their ideology: “Government 
is always inefficient,” or “Government does a better job than people give it credit for.” 
Because these are not necessarily opposing viewpoints, nor does the “liberal” answer 
represent a true leftist position, it is hard to ascertain where someone truly lies on the 
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ideological spectrum. With this in mind, one can see that a dichotomy between liberal 
and conservative ideologies is a false one, because their views are not necessarily 
opposite of one another. Since “liberal” versus “conservative” does not produce a true 
dichotomy, it is important for the purposes of this study to produce a scale that more fully 
represents the political spectrum. Therefore, using truly opposite terms, such as “Solid-
left” and “Solid-right,” allowed for a better distinction between ideologies.  
 Due to the participant pool of this study being college students, simplifying the 
range of choices in terms of political identity they have was beneficial as they may not all 
have adequate political knowledge. Therefore, where respondents are asked about their 
political ideology, they have the option to enter their preferred labels, which could 
include anything from “anarchist” to “libertarian,” respondents could also choose from a 
list of more generic choices: “solidly left,” “lean-left,” “centrist/moderate,” “lean right,” 
and “solidly right.” While these labels may or may not correspond with the more specific 
labels political scholars may use, these choices gave participants more clearly identifiable 
labels, that could then be essentially translated into different labels, based upon the 
answers given. In addition, what it means to be “far-left” and “far-right” are more easily 
understood and agreed upon, as opposed to attempting to parse through the intricacies of 
the various strains of Marxism, for example.   
 The set of “level of agreement” questions are a combination of affirmations taken 
from the Pew Ideological Consistency survey, as well as textbook definitions of far-right 
positions and ideologies. For example, questions borrowed from the Pew survey ask 
questions such as “Should homosexuality be promoted?” as well as “Does too much 
government regulation of businesses hurt economic development?” With these 
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standardized questions, a certain measure of validity in the responses can be counted on, 
since they have been used in prior research. In addition, questions that ask about issues 
that are pertinent in today’s political landscape are phrased from a far-right perspective in 
order to have a consistent level of measurement to work from. For example, the survey 
asks, on a Likert scale, to what extent participants agree with the statements, “Strong 
enforcement of national borders are necessary for security,” as well as, “Government 
surveillance of individuals is necessary to protect our safety.” The responses to these 
statements are not only telling about an individual’s political leanings, but they are also 
important because they are tests of how much of a role media plays in shaping ideologies, 
since these are very contemporary issues, given that the participants do not have fully 
self-formed positions on them. Lastly, level of agreement statements are asked, in which 
the participants evaluate far-right positions, such as, “My culture is superior to others,” 
and “Worker’s unions impede economic progress.” The aggregate of these scores likely 
provided a fair insight as to the participant’s positioning along the political spectrum, 
which was then be compared to where they initially placed themselves in the question 
about political self-identification. These two items were used to gauge the extent of any 
cognitive dissonance.  
 Beyond uncovering whether what media consumption habits lead to ideological 
dissonance, this study also helped illuminate to the extent to which media consumption 
habits affect certain political beliefs. Given that the questions in the “level of agreement” 
section all deal with contemporary issues or topics, there may be an association between, 
say, heavy cable news consumption in general, and strong anti-immigrant sentiment, 
regardless of the individual’s political party affiliation. Similarly, if one is more 
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passionate in regards to a specific issue, like LGBT rights, those individuals might tend to 
gravitate to a certain news sources or platforms because of their coverage or spin of that 
issue. 
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Data Collection/Analysis 
 
 Primarily, most of the data collected was quantitative. This data was in the form 
of numbers derived from participants’ answers to the “level of agreement” statements, 
ranging from “-2” to “2,” with -2 being farther left and 2 being farther right along the 
political spectrum. These numbers were aggregated to give the participant a total score in 
order to place them along the political spectrum. For example, since there are 18 level-of-
agreement questions, the maximum score would be 36, which would place the participant 
at the farthest right edge of the political spectrum. If the participant were to score a 14, 
for example, they would be slightly on the left side of the political spectrum. These 
scores were then be compared to how they self-identified, in order to determine a level of 
ideological consistency.  
 One answer necessitates qualitative data: where participants were asked to key-in 
any specific political label they use to describe themselves politically. This response 
allowed the participant to more accurately detail their chosen position along the political 
spectrum, which also allowed for an even more accurate comparison of their ideology 
and their actual beliefs.  
 Other patterns were analyzed from the data collected, such as if a participant 
heavily favors one news source over another in terms of “trustworthiness,” and its 
association to views on a given issue, as well as the frequency they rely on a news source 
for political information. Similarly, participants were asked if they have voted in either of 
the prior two national elections, in order to help gauge political activity. Given the 
generally youthful demographic to be surveyed in this study, some new insight could be 
gathered as to whether this generation’s sense of political efficacy, their level of political 
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engagement, and their political ideologies correlate with their media consumption 
patterns. 
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Challenges 
 
 In terms of challenges that this particular research may face, the first may be the 
validity of the answers produced by some of the questions. For example, while some 
questions are based off of prior academic surveys, others are based off of more non-
traditionally academic sources, such as the Pew Research questions. Similarly, other 
questions in the “political ideology” section are based off of generally agreed upon 
features and positions regarding one’s political ideology, rather than being utilized 
directly from another source. While not all of the questions are necessarily grounded in 
prior studies or scholarship, this may also prove to benefit the study in terms of adding a 
layer of precision, if these questions yield any significant results. 
 This research may also be complicated if a significant group of participants do not 
understand some of the political terminology used in the questions, or if they are not 
familiar with the various news media organizations named in the media consumption 
questions. While these potential problems may be somewhat mitigated by giving 
participants multiple selections to choose from, these questions are in operation under the 
assumption that the participants are at least generally aware of the nature of the news and 
the manner in which that news is presented by the various media outlets. While the 
survey asks participants about both political party affiliation and if they have another 
political ideology they identify with, if the participants have limited knowledge of the 
parties, or any of the ideologies they have to chose from (though an option for “other,” 
with the ability to type in one’s own answer exists in the same question), the answers 
they give may not provide the proper information needed.  
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 One limitation present in this research was the population/sample, which 
consisted of college students. In this case, college students are likely more politically and 
media savvy than the rest of the general population, which undoubtedly skews some of 
the data. However, general trends present in the data point to larger phenomena, making 
this research a sort of pre-test. 
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Ethical Considerations 
 
 Various precautions were taken to ensure the anonymity of the participants and 
their answers to this survey. The survey did not require the participant to record their 
name, age, or gender anywhere on the survey. Furthermore, the survey itself did not 
require the participants to sign-up for an account of any kind, nor did Qualtrics, the 
survey tool used for distribution of this survey, ask for any identifying information. 
Instead, a link directly to the survey was provided to a large sample size of potential 
participants, who are then able to decide whether they are willing to participate or abstain 
(of which there is no penalty). Participants in this survey were communications students 
at Marquette University. The assisting professors of these students made the survey 
available to their students via a link on their courses website, and allowed students to 
obtain course credit while maintaining anonymity.  
 Since the questions in the survey are asking about general attitudes and sentiments 
common in political or social discourse, it is highly unlikely that answering them would 
lead to any distress on the behalf of the participants. Respondents also have the ability to 
skip any question in the survey, so they can skip anything that might make them 
uncomfortable. The answers recorded from the survey were not tied to the individual 
participant in any way, which ensures that they need not be fearful of truthfully 
answering any question in any manner.  
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Usefulness in Contemporary Scholarship 
 
 Given that the political landscape is constantly in flux, this research not only 
served to reinforce existing research, but possibly shed light on new and interesting 
associations between media consumption, political ideology (and disconnect), and 
willingness to engage in politics amongst the nation’s newest voters. In addition, new 
patterns in media consumption as they relate to specific contemporary issues may also 
emerge. Lastly, the results of this survey may highlight a need to further media literacy 
programs in order to increase political participation and general feelings of political 
efficacy. 
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Summation 
 
 Ultimately, this research aims to serve as a pre-test in order to help determine to 
what extent the media fosters political action and ideological incongruence. While the 
conclusions are not necessarily generalizable for the whole population, the trends 
observed can help focus research efforts in the future in order to uncover the extent of the 
media’s influence on our political beliefs.  
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Data and Analysis 
 
General results  
 
After gathering the data, SPSS was used in order to first aggregate general trends 
in the survey. Among the important frequency tests ran, the “ideological score,” when 
compared to where each participant placed themselves along the political spectrum was 
the most helpful to affirm one of the core theses of this research. First, in order to 
calculate the “ideological score,” each participant’s answers for the Likert scale questions 
were coded where a “-2” represented the most leftist position on the issue, and a “2” 
represented the most right-wing position on the issue. The numbers in between 
represented the remainder of the political spectrum. For example, if participants answered 
with a “-2, 0 and 1,” on three given questions, their score would be a “-1” or lean left. For 
this study, all 17 Likert scale questions were added for each participant to give them their 
own unique Ideology Score.  
 Because one of the main premises of this study was to determine to what degree 
individuals misidentify themselves politically, comparing the participants’ ideology 
scores to their chosen place along the political spectrum. While one could make these 
comparisons on each individual participant, a much more time-efficient method is to 
compare the frequencies of the scores, as well as where most participants placed 
themselves along the political spectrum.  
 Of the 309 participants, 305 of them responded to the Ideology score questions. 
The ideology scores from the participants ranged from “-32,” which would be almost 
extreme left-wing, to “36,” or extreme right-wing. In order to merge the Ideology score 
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scale and the political spectrum placement score on the same scale for comparison, the 
parameters for the scale are as follows: Solid left would be comprised of scores ranging 
from “-36” to “-18.” Lean left would be comprised of the scores of “-18” to “-9.” Centrist 
would be comprised of the scores “-9” to “9.” Lean right would be comprised of the 
scores 9 to 18. Finally, Solid right would be comprised of the scores 18 to 36. 
Alternatively, we could also consider scores from -18 to -1 to be Lean left and scores of 1 
to 18 to be Lean right.  
 The dispersion of those scores can be matched up and compared to how 
participants identified themselves on the political spectrum. 11.5% of participants 
identified themselves as Solid left, whereas 9.5% of participants actually answered in a 
manner consistent with being solid left. 29.2% of participants self-identified as Lean left, 
whereas 27.7% displayed Lean left tendencies in the survey. 34.1% of participants 
identified themselves as Centrist, while 56.7 % answered questions in the survey 
consistent with centrism.  20% of participants identified as Lean right, though only 3.7 
had scores between 9 and 18. However, 24.6% of participants had scores between 1 and 
18. Finally, 5.2% of participants self-identified as Solid right, though only 2.4% 
answered the survey in a manner consistent with right-wing thought.  
 Furthermore, a regression model was run with participants’ self-declared political 
position constant, and their ideology score was dependent. The model showed a 
significant relationship between the two (p<.001, b=5.918), meaning that participants, in 
general were fairly accurate in their self-placement along the political spectrum in 
relation to their views. In addition, a Pearson’s correlation model was performed using 
these same variables, which also showed that there is indeed a correlation (p=.623) 
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between participants’ self-assessment on the political spectrum and their corresponding 
views, thus, answering RQ3. 
 From these comparisons, a few general conclusions can be reached. Overall, 
against one of the central research questions, participants were actually fairly accurate in 
self-identifying their political labels. Perhaps the population used in this study was a key 
factor in this dispersion. Because the participants were from fields other than Political 
Science, their views on politics remained more neutral, possibly because they were not as 
well-versed on these issues as those from other disciplines. One might also suggest that 
because of the polarized climate of politics in America, participants may have felt more 
inclined to choose either a left-wing or right-wing label, rather than identifying as a 
centrist, where a significant amount of participants ended up in terms of ideology score. 
While the results of making these general comparisons were not as skewed as previously 
theorized, we can see other significant relationships at play in regards to media 
consumption and participants’ ideological scores. 
  
Ideological score as it relates to political satire shows 
 
 The level of attention paid to certain media forms had a significant impact on 
participants’ ideological scores. Regression models found a strong association (p<.001, 
b=1.656) between paying more attention to political satire shows, such as Last Week 
Tonight with John Oliver, and having more leftist beliefs. Perhaps this is not surprising, 
given that there is a dearth of right-leaning political satire shows, so those with right-
wing beliefs likely shy away from these types of shows. One may also conclude that 
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viewers that would otherwise be neutral have gravitated towards these shows, and their 
ideologies have been shaped by repeated viewership.  
 
Ideological score as it relates to political talk radio 
 
 The level of attention paid to political talk radio had a positive association to 
one’s ideological score, according to regression models (p<.001, b=-2.246). That is to 
say, the more attention one pays to political talk radio, the more conservative they 
answered the ideological questions. Of course, political talk radio has generally become 
more conservative. Shows hosted by the likes of Al Franken are long defunct, and 
instead, prominent figures such as Rush Limbaugh dominate the airwaves. Often times, 
these shows do not make their intentions ambiguous, as they cater to a right-wing 
audience, which likely helps solidify a conservative identity for that group of listeners.  
 
Ideological score as it relates to cable news 
 
 While not as high of a degree of association as political satire and talk radio 
shows, the amount of attention one pays to cable news networks has a fairly high degree 
of association to one’s ideological score (p=.051, b=-1.045). That is to say, the more one 
relies on cable news for political information, the more likely they are to have 
conservative tendencies. While it is well-known that Fox News, a conservative network, 
is among the most highly watched stations in America, there is a higher variation of 
prominent cable news networks that span the political spectrum than satirical and talk 
radio shows. Therefore, this result is at least mildly telling, in that right-leaning cable 
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news networks seem to have more influence. One point of note, given the population, is 
that college students generally watch the least television of any age demographic. What 
that means for this data, is that perhaps those with conservative tendencies choose to seek 
out information from networks like Fox News, rather than stumbling upon them and 
having their views subsequently shaped. 
 
Ideological score as it relates to other mediums 
 
 While the three aforementioned mediums were found to have statistical 
significance in relation to the attention paid them and one’s ideological score, the other 
mediums did not. Participants in the survey reported using the Internet as their primary 
preferred medium to access news far more than any other (television, print, radio). 
Therefore, one might have expected commentary from web-based sources to have a more 
significant impact on one’s ideology, however with high scores in the regression model 
(p=.261, b=-.530), we see this is not the case. Perhaps with this more media savvy and 
literate population, participants may not be as prone to pay as much attention to these 
sources if they are seen as less credible than traditional news sources. 
 Attention paid to national newspapers for political news was also not found to 
have a significant impact on one’s ideology (p=.319, b=.471). The age demographic 
represented in the study’s population was likely to not read newspapers on any regular 
basis. Also, at a time when rhetoric declaring traditionally credible news sources as “fake 
news” has become en vogue, perhaps trust has eroded for this particular age 
demographic, leading fewer individuals to pursue information via newspapers. 
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 Lastly, gathering political information from political fact-checking or candidate 
websites was found to have the least significant impact on one’s ideology (p=.920,      
b=.-060). One might hypothesize that those who regularly check fact-checking sites for 
information would have their ideology experience larger shifts due to concrete evidence 
being levied against misconceptions. However, as we have reviewed in previous 
literature, confirmation and selectivity bias likely would mitigate any significant impact 
that these websites would generate. Perhaps it is no surprise that political candidate 
websites had the least amount of sway on one’s ideology, given that these websites often 
lack any real substance in terms of policy information or news. In addition, one would 
assume that most information seekers would not visit the website of a candidate that had 
opposing views to that of the information seeker, and therefore, there would be little 
chance of any of these sites shifting or shaping one’s ideology. 
  
Ideology score as it relates to news consumption time 
 
 Another surprising result from this study was that the total amount of time one 
spends consuming news does not have a significant impact on participants’ ideological 
scores (p=.842, b= .180). One might assume that the more time spent gathering 
information, in general, would have an impact on ideology. Considering the population of 
the study, which likely has higher critical thinking and reasoning skills than the general 
population, one might assume that regardless of their preferred news sources, they would 
be able to parse and reason with information from any source in order to transform their 
ideology. However, regression models run with this data did not find this to be the case. 
Instead, the model found that the amount of attention paid to national television news, 
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political satire shows, and political talk radio, had more impact as opposed to raw news 
consumption time. This phenomenon may be attributed to the perceived lack of 
substantive political information in the media, in general, therefore, individuals may 
gravitate towards the aforementioned three mediums for actual information, and browse 
the others without much thought directed at the information presented to them.  
 
Relationship between voting and ideology score 
 
 Regression models found a significant association between one’s political 
efficacy and their ideology score (p=<.005, b=-3.494). Those who reported having voted 
in a national election were significantly more likely to have a lower ideology score, 
meaning they have more leftist tendencies. Conversely, those who reported never voting 
in a national election were found to have a higher ideological score, meaning they have 
more conservative tendencies. Interestingly, the same model found that one’s ideas of 
political efficacy did not have a significant impact on ideological score (p=.598, b=-
.315). That is to say, believing that an individual does not have the ability to influence 
government in any meaningful way is not a significant component of one’s political 
ideology. However, the relationship between one’s political activity in the method of 
voting and one’s ideology should not be ignored. This shows us that the less conservative 
one’s beliefs are, the more likely they are to vote. This is further evidenced by greater 
numbers of individuals voting for the Democratic Party in previous elections. 
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Relationship between ideology score and trust in media 
 
 Regression models also found a significant relationship between one’s level of 
trust in the media to report news fully, fairly and accurately, and one’s ideology score 
(p<.05, b=-2.205). The more a participant reported trusting the media, the lower their 
ideology score, meaning they had more leftist tendencies. Conversely, the more distrust 
reported by participants, the more likely they were to display conservative tendencies. As 
previously discussed, rhetoric on the political right regarding the prevalence of “fake 
news” likely allows for more rampant cognitive dissonance, leading otherwise 
trustworthy sources to be distrusted.  
 Furthermore, in order to answer RQ2, a regression model was performed to 
determine if there is a relationship between trust placed in news media and political 
action. While not showing extremely significant results, the model did show somewhat of 
a relationship between both trust in media and voting (p=.098, b=.075), as well as trust in 
media and feelings of political efficacy (p=.163, b=-.133). Therefore, we can say that the 
level of trust one places in the media has at least some impact upon political efficacy and 
action. 
 
Relationship between individual issues and media selectivity  
 
 We can also observe significant relationships between amount of attention paid to 
certain news sources and one’s position on various individual issues. In these results, 
which help answer RQ1, we can see just how significant of an impact the media has on 
framing and presenting political topics and information: 
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 Border security 
 
 Regression models found a significant relationship (p=.014, b=-.145) between the 
amount of attention one pays to national network television news and their stance on 
border security. Data analysis shows that the more attention one pays to national network 
news, the more likely they are to identify border security as a major pressing issue. Given 
that this study has also found that conservatives are more likely to watch national 
network news, they are more likely to have their views of border security shaped by those 
sources. Since networks like Fox News often prominently feature stories about border 
walls and illegal immigration, the commentary that those stories generates is likely to 
influence its viewers. Because networks like Fox News frame those issues as grave 
national security threats, it is not surprising that its viewers adopt the same stance. 
Interestingly, the same model found that while border security was likely to be identified 
as a pressing issue by national network news viewers, the related topic of illegal 
immigration was not as likely identified as a pressing issue.  
 
Climate change 
 
 One interesting note from this data is the idea that perhaps there are certain issues 
that have become so entrenched in popular discourse, that media selection plays no role 
in influencing one’s position. Regression models found that regardless of one’s 
propensity to watch cable news networks for political information, views on issues like 
climate change remained constant (p=.153, b=-.074). One might hypothesize that if an 
individual is a regular cable news viewer of networks such as Fox News, they may be 
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more likely to brush off climate change as a non-salient issue. However, the data showed 
no significant relationship between the two. Given that roughly 83% of all respondents 
identified climate change as at least a somewhat pressing issue, we might conclude that 
certain issues hold generational significance. Even if one is an avid conservative news 
consumer, perhaps certain stances on issues are shaped more by popular discourse with 
peers, as well as real-world interactions, rather than agendas set by the news.  
 
Income inequality 
 
 Roughly 69% of respondents reported income inequality to be at least somewhat 
of a pressing issue, while only about 15% did not believe that it is. We are able to see that 
consumers of certain news types made up the overwhelming majority of that 15% who do 
not see economic inequality as a relevant issue. For example, regression models found a 
significant relationship between talk radio selectivity and the view of economic 
inequality not being a relevant topic, with a confidence interval of (p<.05, b=-.151). 
While not proven to be statistically significant, the same models found a relatively 
noticeable relationship between cable news viewership and negative views towards the 
relevance of income inequality (p=.118, b=.085). Again, with these two examples, we are 
able to see the agenda setting and opinion shaping power set forth by media, especially 
conservative-leaning media. 
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Other findings 
 
 With the rise of social media consumption, one might have expected to find that 
commentators on various platforms would have a higher level of influence on certain 
issues. Whether right or left-leaning, most corporate media seem to not take radical 
stances on topics such as police brutality, military imperialism, and capitalism. However, 
because not all prominent social media commentators and influencers are tied to these 
corporate media entities, they often are able to freely adopt and express views that might 
otherwise be controversial. For example, a fairly prominent political commentator on 
Twitter is “Existential Comics” (@existentialcoms), has roughly 300,000 followers, and 
according to the Twitter analytics platform POPSTERS.us, those followers are primarily 
in the same age bracket as respondents of this study. This account regularly espouses 
views against capitalism and military interventionism, as well as other establishment 
ideas. Given that one does not have to necessarily expressly follow an account in order to 
come into contact with its tweets, one may assume that individuals may, with at least 
some regularity, be exposed to opposing viewpoints, such as these. Since 59% of 
respondents reported paying at least some attention to political commentators on social 
media, one might hypothesize that exposure to more controversial positions on these 
topics might lead followers to adopt similar stances, at least in a general sense. However, 
regression models found no significant association between paying attention to social 
media accounts for political information and stances on any given issue in the survey. 
Since this survey consisted of participants who are generally media savvy, perhaps this 
means a certain level of credibility must be perceived by these types of news consumers 
in order for them to adopt views espoused in media. The editorial and opinionated nature 
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of social media commentators might be a turn-off for those more well-educated, and 
therefore, may be less likely to have an influence, as opposed to those less media savvy 
and less educated. 
 One final surprising result of this study was that participants almost wholly shied 
away from picking a political label other than a party affiliation. A question in the survey 
gave participants the option to choose a write in a label to describe their political 
ideology, or choose from a list that contained terms such as “anarchist” and “neoliberal.” 
Roughly 75% of respondents abstained from choosing any of the provided labels, or 
providing their own label. Of the few labels written in by respondents, “Socialist” or 
“Democratic Socialist” were the most popular with two apiece. The absence of label 
selecting by participants may be evident of a few factors. For one, perhaps these 
respondents were potentially not politically literate enough to understand either what the 
preselected labels meant, or did not have enough information to label themselves. 
Another possibility is that perhaps these labels simply do not carry enough meaning to 
warrant selection. Given that roughly 83% of respondents identified themselves as either 
Republican or Democrat, we can clearly see that there is some semblance of identity 
formation present. Since 75% of participants abstained from choosing any ancillary label 
at all, this may be evidence that other political distinctions are not important to 
individuals. This phenomenon may be a symptom of the establishment two-party system 
in American politics, where other labels and parties are generally dismissed as “fringe” 
ideas. 
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What conclusions could not be reached? 
 
 While this study provided us a more clear insight into the media’s influence on 
political identity and issue stance, several questions remain unanswered due to many 
factors. The most glaring question remaining is to what extent do individuals misuse 
political labels? One of the core research questions in this study aimed at illuminating 
potential misunderstandings of what certain political labels mean. For example, this could 
have been tested in this study by having a sizable portion of the respondents select one of 
the preset labels, and comparing that label to their ideology score in order to see if they 
had a full understanding of what their chosen political label meant. However, due to the 
overwhelming majority of participants abstaining from this section of the survey, coupled 
with somewhat neutered questions and content in the rest of the survey, the extent of this 
problem could not be determined. 
 The heavily localized population used in this study also may have hampered 
potential findings. Because the population only consisted of a very specific demographic, 
we are not able to make broad generalizations in regards to the findings. Perhaps a more 
representative population sample would have yielded a broader range of political labels 
and news consumption habits to compare, however, due to budgetary restrictions, the 
survey was focused on a very specific, convenient population. 
 Finally, the question of whether individuals gravitate towards certain news 
sources for information due to a perceived ideological consistency, or if they have their 
views shaped by these news sources simply via exposure, remains unsolved. Perhaps 
questions in the survey that focused more specifically on habitual or affable attitudes 
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towards certain news sources, or asking participants what news sources they use to learn 
about specific issues would have yielded more substantial results to this question.  
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Overall findings 
 
 The results of the survey, while not wholly generalizable, yielded the following 
significant results: 
There are significant associations between one’s ideology and what type of media 
they pay the most attention to: 
o Those with leftist tendencies tend to pay more attention to satirical news 
sources 
o Those with more right-wing ideals tend to pay more attention to national 
network news and talk radio for news 
This could mean either, individuals with these tendencies gravitate to these news 
sources because of their perceived ideological nature, or, these sources shape their 
views. 
 
Generally speaking, participants had more centrist tendencies, and they were 
reasonably accurate in identifying this. 
o There was not a large discrepancy between the range of participants’ 
ideological scores and where they self-identified along the ideological 
spectrum 
o Though a simple majority of participants had negative ideological scores, 
they were typically only within a few points of zero, indicating generally 
centrist tendencies, even if they identified as “lean left,” which could be 
categorized as essentially the same. 
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Raw news consumption time does not impact one’s ideological score, rather, 
amount of attention paid to certain sources does. 
o As previously mentioned, attention paid to national network news, talk 
radio and political satire shows has a greater impact on one’s ideology 
than total time spent consuming news. 
 
Stances on individual issues are more significantly shaped by certain news 
sources 
o Stances on issues like border security and economic inequality are more 
likely to be impacted by one’s media consumption than other issues 
o Certain stances on issues, especially climate change, remain constant 
regardless of media selectivity or political affiliation 
Level of trust in media is correlated with one’s ideological score 
o The lower your ideological score is, which is affiliated with leftist 
tendencies, is generally emblematic of a higher trust in the media to report 
news fully, fairly, and accurately. 
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Potential research flaws 
 
 While this study utilized a semi-sizable population, the inherent limitations 
caused by the localized population certainly may have hampered the overall research. If 
there had been a greater level of funding for this research, a greater, more diverse 
population could have been reached in order to provide a truer sense of political attitudes.  
 Another potential flaw in this research may have been that the participants were 
not as well versed in political topics and labels, which certainly would have effected how 
they identified themselves, as well as their attitudes on issues. The striking lack of 
diversity in political labels may be a cue that may college students simply do not have 
enough political knowledge to pick a label for themselves other than “liberal” or 
“conservative.” Initially, one of the premises of this research was to identify if a great 
number of individuals’ political identities were warped by their media consumption. In 
order to test this, participants would have had to have chosen a varying degree of political 
labels, which was not the case in this research.  
 
Potential for future research 
 
 While this research helped to provide a baseline of political attitudes for college 
students as they relate to their media habits, perhaps this study could be considered a 
precursor to a more grandiose project. Some of the general trends observed in this study 
are encouraging in that we are starting to notice exactly what issues are shaped by various 
news media consumption, therefore subsequent projects may use some of these measures 
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to sample a greater population in order to gather a greater sense of just how influential 
news media is in regards to political identity and issue stances. 
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